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Chapter 9 
 
Co-opting civil society activism in Iran  
 
Paola Rivetti 
 
Introduction 
The issue of civil society activism and its supposedly positive role in fostering 
political transitions to democracy is a long-standing debate in the democratisation 
literature and has been analyzed by scholars and explored with interest by donors and 
politicians too. Traditionally, civil society activism has been viewed as crucial in 
bringing about the democratic transformations of authoritarian regimes, but more 
recent studies have highlighted how civil activism may paradoxically lead to 
‘authoritarian upgrading’1 rather than democratic advancement.2 Such findings run 
counter to the ones postulated by the democratisation paradigm, but the current 
dichotomous debate should not overlook other potential lines of inquiry, linked in 
particular to the functions civil organisations have in a specific political system. By 
examining what meanings are behind the banner of ‘civil society’ and its uses, it is 
possible to provide a clearer picture of the dynamics at work between ruling elites and 
civil activism in an authoritarian context like Iran. The objective of this chapter is to 
capture such dynamics going beyond the traditional representation of a country 
simplistically divided between ‘civil society’ and the state by focusing on their 
interaction. Exploring the nature of civil activism and in particular the relations 
between state and civil organisations during the two last presidencies, this study offers 
an account of the techniques displayed by the regime in order to set up and govern a 
‘system of obedience’ through the control of civil organisations. 3 This highlights how 
the Iranian regime considers violence and repression only one among the many tools 
of political control.
4
 Recalling Michel Foucault, the way the Iranian regime exercises 
power and perpetrates soft coercion
5
 will be explored. Such an ‘operation of 
alignment’ can be channelled through the official bureaucracy and through any kind 
of organisation, with little importance for their legal or supposed status – dependent or 
independent.  
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In addition, the study will also address how those civil organisations which accepted 
such a ruling system enjoyed significant benefits. The civil organisations’ behaviour 
will be explored, beyond the idea that the relation between them and the government 
is over-determined by the latter. In the game of state-society relations, the regime is 
only one of the players and civil organisations, even those very close to the power, 
can find an independent path to raise their voice and make ‘unintended’ and 
problematic demands. This means that the option for civil society groups is not simply 
between repression and collaboration. As a matter of fact, there is a long list of 
possibilities to be included in. Through the analysis of both government’s actions and 
organisations’ reactions, organisations become a tool in the researcher’s hands to 
highlight the mechanisms of consensus and mutual political strengthening. 
Following on from this argument, the distinction between NGOs and ‘GONGOs’ is 
not considered a useful analytical tool to explore the relations between the 
government and civil society groups. Although the normative difference is not 
questioned, even the independent and ‘liberal-looking’ NGOs – which, in the Iranian 
case, may be better labelled ‘reformist-oriented’ and ‘human rights-oriented’ – have 
served the government’s interests, thus protecting their interests too. In order to 
highlight the terms of such closeness, the essay compares a context of ‘authoritarian 
enhancement’, namely Ahmadinejad’s times, with a context of political liberalisation, 
or Khatami’s times.  
 
Iran: The Mainstream Narrative of Civil Activism  
For a number of years, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been depicted as being on the 
verge of political change and, more specifically, of a process of democratic transition. 
Khatami’s election to the presidency in 1997 galvanized these expectations. His 
relaxed style and good-natured criticism of the harsh attitudes of the conservative 
establishment caused a common and almost universal wave of support for the ‘smiling 
mullah’ among ordinary Iranians. More significantly, his political discourse, focusing 
on effective and forceful key words such as ‘democracy’, ‘civil society’, ‘rule of law’, 
and ‘dialogue among civilisations,’ appealed to the wider public. Thus, even when the 
‘demo-crazy’6 wave in the literature on political change in the Arab world subsided 
due the fact that the genuine regime changes were just not taking place in the Middle 
East,
7
 the Iranian case still excited a number of scholars and policy-makers who 
  281 
believed a radical change towards democratic governance to be imminent. The shared 
assumption was that, despite all the difficulties and the fierce conservative opposition, 
Khatami was ruling a dynamic country, whose active and autonomous civil society 
would lead to a more liberal and democratic exercise of power thanks to the strength 
of young people and women’s engagement.8 Such a representation of reality became 
popular both in scholarly and policy making circles, promoting the conflation of the 
concepts of civil society, personal engagement, democratisation, and human rights 
NGOs, whose activities were assumed to help a democratic transition.
9
 It is 
sometimes even suggested that there is an ongoing confrontation between ‘modernity 
and tradition’ in the field of social engagement,10 where NGOs play a modernizing 
social and political role, educating to civility and citizenship.  
The strength of this narrative, focused on people’s political struggle, social 
resistance, and engagement, is not understandable without considering past 
stereotypes portraying Iranian society as submissive, politically homogeneous, and 
socially static. The reaction to this cliché has caused, however, a shift from 
representing Iran as a homogeneous society to one portraying Iran as ‘schizophrenic.’ 
This understanding of Iranian reality is also present in non-academic literature. Here, 
the contrast between a public sphere dominated by a strict Islamic code of behaviour 
and a private life characterized, on the contrary, by crazy parties and sexual 
libertinism is popular.
11
 Such a binary representation moulds the representation of the 
social and political life of the country too, seen as deeply divided between a dynamic 
‘civil society’ and an authoritarian state-system.12 Following the logic of this 
comparison, the country has often been perceived in the middle of a confrontation 
between ‘modernity and tradition’13 – which has sometimes been understood as the 
struggle between ‘democracy and Islam.’ Claiming the existence of a ‘civil society’ 
was thus perceived as a way to defend the idea of Iran as a diverse and tolerant 
country; and more precisely, in this context NGOs were the distinctive mark of 
modernity, distinguished from the forms of popular solidarity or informal welfare that 
already existed in Iran.   
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Civil Organisations as a Device for Support and Discontent Control 
During Khatami’s Era 
In Khatami’s era, the rhetoric of civil society and the establishment of NGOs reached 
an unprecedented popularity.
14
 Khatami – a rather weak president, caught between 
powerful opponents and an impatient electoral base – directed his efforts in 
establishing a strategy based on a number of key words such as reform and a diffused 
and supportive base of political activism. As the reformists’ motto stated: ‘pressure 
from below and negotiation (chuneh, also translated as ‘bickering’) at the top.’ This 
project was reflected in the reformists’ idea of ‘civil society’: a bottom-up movement 
supporting the upper level, which would have been thus defended by the emerging 
societal consensus in favour of reform. In order to build up such a system, Khatami 
and his allies facilitated through the legislative process the creation of associations 
and civil organisations. A special and dedicated bureaucratic apparatus was created to 
promote the establishment of NGOs because, as stated in the Third Development Plan 
(2000-2005), ‘the government, by necessity, depends on the NGOs […] which by 
their sheer nature are in constant contact with the people.’15 For its part, ‘the 
government must provide necessary support, create opportunities and facilitate an 
empowering environment for the work of NGOs.’16 Such governmental support for 
civil society support was demonstrated through the establishment of a Central 
Supervisory Board, composed of NGOs representatives in continuous contact with the 
Social Affair Sector of the Ministry of Interior. The shared idea was that ‘an organised 
society is a developed society’17 and this should have constituted the first step toward 
the creation of a pasokhguy government
18
: accountable government. Through the 
structuring of independent associations, according to a widespread opinion, it would 
then be possible to lead the change towards democracy, even if indirectly.
19
 This 
‘organised civil society’ was both independent and integrated in the state’s institutions 
and it is no coincidence that many positions and names on both sides overlap.
20
 For 
instance, many politicians and governmental officials headed non-governmental 
organisations, ‘independent’ newspapers, or governmental offices for legal initiatives 
while being ‘independent’ critics.  
The Khatami government did not only encourage the development of civil society, 
but took very direct action in sponsoring the establishment of ‘NGOs.’ According to 
some opinions, this is the reason why the NGOs network was established in 1998 and 
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‘setting up civil organisations was a means employed by Khatami’s administration to 
divert the attention from the crack-down of internal dissent. In this way, the 
government was proving that the goals stated in official statements and speeches 
[namely, the strengthening of ‘civil society’ and organisations] had a practical 
application too.’21 The birth of this network of organisations was the outcome of a 
conference held in the same year, which saw the participation of many among the 
parliamentary deputies, international organisations representatives, and some 
representatives of the Iranian associations sector, paradoxically headed by an 
influential deputy of the Interior Minister. The foundation of this network had the 
consequence of setting a de facto model for NGOs, justifying the government’s 
‘politics of participation’22 which put forward the criteria to be followed in order to be 
a trusted and accepted organisation.  
The duties of this network included managing and regulating NGOs’ relations with 
the government on the one side, and with transnational channels of fundraising on the 
other. From this position, the network was able to control almost all the relations 
every association had. The member associations were under close scrutiny, and, 
furthermore, the Deputy Interior Minister remained a key member of the NGOs’ 
network management for many years. The members of this network often enjoyed 
indirect advantages. For some, the advantage was prestige: for instance, the president 
of one of the most important women’s organisations in Tehran was nominated head of 
the Presidential bureau for legal initiatives on women’s condition. Another member, 
who left Iran shortly after Ahmadinejad’s victory, became a leading member of the 
Presidential bureau for NGOs initiatives, an experience which allowed her to 
accumulate a high degree of credibility among Iranians both at home and abroad. For 
others, the advantage was increased political credibility. Engaged in associations and 
Khatamism, some people gained a high level of social recognition and credibility – 
something that Daniel Gaxie called the ‘rewards for militancy.’23 This is something 
they enjoy today too, although they escaped from Iran, and foreign governments and 
journalists look at them as important stakeholders to be consulted and whose views 
should be considered when issues about Iran on the international stage are raised.
24
 
For others still, advantages were more direct: help from the presidency, support and 
protection from eventual juridical harassment, faster administrative track to obtain 
permissions or documents. For instance, some organisations received eviction notices 
for their offices due to the activities and this was taken care of by the presidency. 
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Specifically, this was the case of a women organisation which offered shelter and 
legal assistance to women victims of harassment. The organisation was told to leave 
its headquarters, yet managed to gain informal presidential support and avoided 
eviction.
25
  
These techniques of ‘taming’ civil organisations paradoxically engendered 
however a desire of political independence. Thus, a relevant part of civil organisations 
were among the most vocal critics of the government and accused Khatami of being 
weak and too willing to compromise. In some cases the reformist government reacted 
to this criticism by resorting to mechanisms of soft coercion, such as undermining the 
political credibility and trustworthiness of individual activists and through a 
propagandistic use of the information apparatus. This was the strategy enacted for 
instance in the case of the student organisation Tahkim-e Vahdat, which became a 
group of ‘hooligans’ when too vocal in their criticism.26 Before then, Khatami had 
extensively celebrated it as the ‘forerunner of democratisation.’ 
The reformist governments also tried to improve Iran’s international and 
diplomatic position through NGOs because the latter can be more welcome 
interlocutors than the government of the Islamic Republic itself, a problematic partner 
for many countries. This was one of the functions of the NGOs’ network and also of 
the Centre for the Dialogue among Religions, an NGO headed by Khatami’s former 
Vice President in the Parliamentary Legal Affairs. The Centre formally helped the 
inter-religious dialogue and informally kept contacts and fostered diplomatic ties. The 
Center for the Dialogue among Civilisations, another NGO headed by Khatami, also 
had similar goals. Many initiatives and meetings were organized
27
 with the goal of  
 
‘enhancing the cooperation between governmental and international agencies, 
and concerned NGOs both domestically and abroad. The most interesting thing is 
that the network became a tool in the reformists’ hands, whilst their image abroad 
was the one of an independent organisation, whose credibility was not questioned 
thanks to the political legitimacy they enjoyed domestically.’28 
 
The NGOs network succeeded in imposing itself as a reliable representative of the 
‘democratic, independent and good’ Iranian associations in the world’s eyes, and in 
particular in the Iranian diaspora’s ones. In fact, it became a tool for the recruitment of 
consensus and volunteer summer-workers among Iranian expatriates who very often 
  285 
are English speakers, well-educated, committed, and represented for many 
organisations ‘a considerable pool of resources’29 to be had for free. Young people 
were attracted by the opportunity of going back to Iran, helping its development, 
democratisation, working for a NGO.
30
 This shows the strength of the rhetoric of 
‘civil society’ and ‘NGOs for good’ all over the world.  
The construction of a coherent universe of references for social activism needed 
the establishment of a cultural hegemony too. The intellectual apparatus that the 
reformists set up has been perceived as a signal of the independent advocacy of ‘civil 
society’ and democratic pressure from below.31 Yet when checking the names of those 
involved in the reformist intellectual circles and journalism, we find many members 
of the political elite, whose career is very long and linked to the Islamic left before 
and to reformist political circles later – not really outsiders. Musavi Khoehinia, Sa’id 
Hajjarian, Mehdi Karroubi, Mohammad Reza Khatami, Hamidreza Jalaipour, 
Mashallah Shamsolvaezin, Hashem Aghajari are just some of the names of those who 
distinguished themselves as politicians during the eighties, and later became editors, 
journalists, intellectuals, university professors, writers, sociologists, members of 
professional associations, while maintaining an active role in the political life of the 
country. The government and the reformist elite could thus define what ‘being 
reformist’ was and how ‘civil society engagement’ had to look like. The success of 
this soft coercion was clear: ‘being an activist’ was fashionable among young people, 
and in particular, ‘being a reformist journalist’ was a real status-symbol playing an 
important role in social reputation and self-representation.
32
  
The structuring of political participation can be seen in the call for the 
establishment of political parties too, considered as a mark of ‘political modernity.’ In 
the inaugural speech of the first national congress of the Front for the Iranian-Islamic 
Participation (Jehbe Mosharekat-e Iran-e Islami), the reformist coalition supporting 
Khatami’s governments, Mohammad Reza Khatami, the president’s younger brother 
and leader of the group, declared that ‘the constitution of an open, rational and 
effective political system is our goal. It must be accessible to all the activists [bacheha 
fa’olliyat], who will in this way be able to continue their work… Thus we must 
become a real party, as this is the first step toward a broader transformation.’33 A 
similar position was expressed by the Islamic Labour Party (Hezb-e Kar-e Islami), 
which urged all the active political groups in Iran to state clearly their choices and 
opinions, ‘for not creating confusion among the population.’34 In 2002, with the 
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objective of helping and supporting the establishment of parties, the reformist 
administration created the House of Parties (Khane-ye Hezbha), which registered all 
the political formations in the country. In 2008, their list counted 168 parties,
35
 while 
the Interior Ministry’s statistics considered 240 political organisations (tashakol-ha 
siasi).
36
 Both the difference in the counting and the organisations’ names deserve 
attention: for instance, the registered organisations are the Islamic association of 
pathologists, the Front of Iranian youngsters, the Islamic medical association of Iran, 
or the Azeri graduate association. A huge number of participants were also seen on 
the occasion of the 2000 parliamentary elections, when the reformist coalition, the 
Dovvom-e Khordad Front, listed 232 candidates.
37
 From this the question arises 
whether participation is a synonym for carrying weight and influence. ‘We could 
hardly suggest that these organisations [and nominees] are independent or powerful. 
Instead, I would say that they are elements of a diffused network of support for well-
known candidates,’38 which channel, govern and structure in this way the political 
engagement. The call for participation also aimed at orienting the requests and 
governing ‘modes of participation.’ This testifies to the fact that even within the 
institutional political sphere, the much celebrated ‘pressure from below’ was not free 
indeed, but was more an expression of organised consensus emanating from the top.  
Ziba Jalali Na’ini observed that the efforts made by the then-government to protect 
and assist women’s organisations in the preparation of the 1995 Beijing conference 
was the embodiment of the paradox of being seen by many as a step toward women’s 
empowerment, but being in reality a mean to flatten women’s requests on the 
government’s will.39 
 
 
Civil Organisations’ Control and Interests During Ahmadinejad’s 
Era  
If Khatami’s governments have been associated with the expectation of a political 
ouverture, Ahmadinejad’s Iran is associated with social oppression and control. 
Analyses on political activism during the last five years in Iran underline the 
governmental repression of NGOs on the one side, and the rise of GONGOs on the 
other. Such analyses emphasize the elements of co-optation and social control, 
suggesting the existence of a ‘code of conduct’ which becomes the condition to 
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escape renewed repression. These accounts correctly report the violent coercion 
enacted by Ahmadinejad’s governments and the security apparatus on civil society 
groups. Restrictions however are not only imposed through violence, but can be 
implemented through less overt means: stricter interpretations of the law or new 
administrative obstacles limiting social activism. Finally, new restrictions to political 
agency can be imposed through new definitions of what ‘social activism’ is or how it 
should look like. Once in office, Ahmadinejad took control of the ministries and 
related offices and he proceeded swiftly to replace deputies, amend laws and to 
transform the functions of official posts into duties and rights. The attempt to exercise 
a much stricter control over civil activism was clear from the beginning of his 
mandate.  
The law on civil organisations was changed under the pressure of the Information 
Ministry, with the new text introducing a new name for NGOs and allowing for a 
more restrictive interpretation of the organisations’ legal spaces of action. A new 
Deputy of the Social Sector Affairs, the one dealing with NGOs representatives, was 
nominated and this change caused tensions with the Central Supervisory Board. As a 
matter of fact, the new director decided a general review of the permits issued to 
NGOs, and lobbied ‘with individuals and institutions that previously issued permits, 
for centralizing all the required work at the Interior Ministry.’40 He also accepted the 
interference of the security apparatus into the process for issuing permits to civil 
organisations.
41
 In 2007, the goal of centralisation was achieved through the 
establishment of a Department of Community-based Organisations within the 
Ministry of Interior,
42
 as all the administrative and legal incumbencies concerning 
civil organisations passed on to it. This new environment first ‘disoriented the NGOs 
community,’43 but more significantly it later had the effect of breaking up the unity of 
the NGOs representatives at the Supervisory Board:  
 
‘there has been a strong pressure on the single members of the board […]. There 
had already been cases of arrests, detentions, violent irruptions in the offices of 
some organisations, and people were worried... Families of NGOs workers were 
harassed… some members almost enthusiastically embraced the new diktat of the 
government, and it was exactly what they did before, with the reformists’ one… 
They just adapted to the new course... so, for many the board stopped to be a 
trustable organ,’ 
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said a witness.
44
 This account reports the strong pressure exerted on the community 
of civil organisations. The aim of the government was to divide the ‘good’ from the 
‘bad’: some NGOs lost their licenses and their workers lost the work permit because 
they didn’t accept the governmental pressure. Many fled the country and re-
established their organisations abroad. The aim of establishing a new environment for 
NGOs was however the normalization of organisations’ behaviour, not necessarily 
their definitive exclusion. If the organisations were ready to correct their positions and 
follow the new governmental conservative line, they would be re-integrated in the 
social and economical life of the country. Such a difference is of great importance, as 
it portrays a model where the ‘surveillance’ doesn’t aim at excluding per se, rather at 
gaining loyalty and affiliations. 
In early 2006, after few months that Ahmadinejad started to govern the country, 
the name ‘non-governmental organisations’ was changed in sazmanha-ye mardom-e 
nahad, SAMAN, normally translated as ‘community-based organisations’ or 
‘people’s organisations.’45 Such a change was accompanied by a shift in the 
institutional approach to the organisations. According to some witnesses, even if ‘the 
law hasn’t drastically been changed, we are under much closer scrutiny: our budget 
and our personal opinions are deeply scrutinized, we’re under perpetual stress. Many 
people have passed the last few years trying to convince the government that they are 
not American or Israeli spies.’46 It is reported that during the first year of 
Ahmadinejad’s presidency, almost one hundred organisations lost their permit 
because of ‘the lack of photos and incorrect bureaucratic language in their 
documents.’47 The current attitude of the government is characterized by a 
securitarian outlook, which has become more pronounced since the contested June 
2009 election. New limitations and bans have been set and imposed not only through 
legal actions but also by exploiting the political public discourse, designing a smaller 
and smaller room for political agency and expression for civil organisations. Twenty 
days after the disruption of the 2009 protests, the Tehran prosecutor declared that 
NGOs are the instrument used by international imperialism to carry out coups d’état.48 
Similar remarks have been later confirmed and repeated by Alireza Afshar, former 
bassij commander and current head of the social and cultural section of the Interior 
Ministry (and thus part of the apparatus controlling SAMANs), who added that the 
organisations do not have the right to publicly criticize the government.
49
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Among the civil society community in Iran, the change of the name from NGOs to 
SAMANs has been perceived as a fundamental step in the effort of changing the 
nature of civic activism, as ‘SAMAN does not imply, at a theoretical level, a specific 
relation with government. SAMAN just means popular organisations, and it has a 
very general meaning.’50 The government did not only introduce a new name and 
imposed it on civil society, but attempted to also shift the focus towards themes, such 
as economic development, that the government itself wants to push. According to a 
representative of one of the biggest civil society organisations in Iran, which also 
serves as ‘facilitator’ for the relationships between the SAMANs and the government, 
‘there is a growing interest in the topic of development. We work in this field, and our 
mission is to keep alive the spirit of bassij (mobilization) among the people, so that 
people themselves understand that we can develop.’51 The government’s actions have 
induced a substantial change both in the shape of civil organisations, transforming 
their name and in their contents, promoting development concerns over liberal 
matters. Undoubtedly, a shift has taken place in the symbolism and meaning that the 
expression ‘civil organisations’ vehicles. If ‘NGOs’ in the common sense refers to 
liberal matters and independent agency, ‘SAMAN’ has no such meaning, and the 
regime has worked to establish another universe of reference for this kind of 
associations. The ‘politics of participation’ selects certain organisations fitting the 
criteria of choice, like loyalty and technical skills, engendering competition among the 
organisations, because those perceived to be more trustworthy by the regime are 
promoted to the detriment of others. These ‘regime-sanctioned organisations’ impose 
their activities and views  the others by means of the legitimacy they enjoy, as 
demonstrated by the exacerbation of conflicts, in particular in rural settings, with the 
so-called ‘traditional organisations’ which feel that the government imposes its 
presence through the ‘skilled’ ones. The high estimated value of technical skills is 
another aspect of the efforts made by the government to change the nature of the 
relations with civil organisations. Through the transformation of the organisations’ 
names, their field of action and political agenda, the regime aims at changing them, 
since, by realigning the ‘shape’ of the organisations, what their ‘essence’ should be is 
also suggested. It should be noted however that the emphasis placed on technocratic 
issues is not only due to ‘the fear of human rights-related activities’, but it is also a 
way of re-allocating resources though development projects to constituencies close to 
the regime. As a manager of an organisation involved in a rural project in the province 
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of Southern Khorasan, close to the Afghan border, declared: ‘these projects always 
see the participation of economic actors close to the regime.’52 
The ‘politics of participation’ considers different forms, well beyond the divide 
between exclusion/inclusion and beyond violence, to normalize the organisations’ 
behaviour that can vary from delaying the issuing of permits to undermining the 
credibility of activists through violence and intimidation. For example, there are 
different ranges of time to get a permit for establishing an organisation. It may take 
some weeks, or many years, thus making it possible for someone to give up on the 
project. In contrast to such administrative obstacles, filmed confessions, which are 
widely used, carry a significant degree of psychological or physical violence. In the 
case of Shirin Ebadi’s husband, who talked about the couple’s private life and 
declared that his wife abused him during episodes of domestic violence,
53
 the 
objective was clearly to destroy her credibility as a human rights activist. What is 
more, ‘soft’ and ‘testimonial’ coercion are not the only ways to force organisations to 
obedience: arrests, detentions, arbitrary irruptions and searches have been reported by 
various sources in the last years. This situation mirrors the efforts of the regime to 
build up a sanctioned and loyal base, as associations are an important topic in the 
national political discourse, providing a social base for development projects.
54
 Thus, 
Ahmadinejad’s executives attempt to turn it in their own favour. Rather than shut 
down ‘civil society’ entirely, the regime gradually adopted a range of strategies to 
reassert state control over civil activism, ‘getting closer’ to it and following a 
corporative model, which has been accepted by the organisations when coherent with 
their interests and goals.  
SAMANs are ‘considered to be the strategic partners for the government in 
carrying out the activities in which they are specifically experts … without imposing 
astronomical expenditures upon it [the government],’55 but SAMANs also have 
another important function that goes beyond the management of the distribution of 
resources. Together with professional associations, they increasingly are the channel 
of communication between the different sectors of the elites, in so far as they act as 
political entities. This indicates the importance of ‘the politics of connections.’ In a 
country like Iran, where there is a contested and ambiguous legislation on political 
parties and where even former legal (and governmental) political groups can become 
illegal very quickly – as it happened to the Mosharekat Party and Mujaheddin of the 
Islamic revolution – SAMANs are one of the vehicles to select the élites of tomorrow 
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and reinforce the partnerships of today. According to a member of one of the biggest 
organisations working in the field of development in the country, ‘in the last few 
years, one of the most evident changes is the unprecedented involvement of public 
and semi-private sector managers in our field.’56 According to him, it becomes 
‘mandatory to establish a collaborative relation between the government and skilled 
people, in order to become active and carry out the projects.’ 57  
One of the most effective means to enhance this connection is the organisation of 
big conferences and workshops. These conferences have seen the constant expansion 
of the presence of managers and professional associations, entrepreneurs and 
businessmen. ‘The reason is to make the notion of development more concrete thanks 
to the participation of people potentially interested in investments, whilst before we 
were used to deal with Ministerial functionaries and politicians’58. The presence of 
semi-public managers reinforces the symbolic private-public connection and the 
involved actors become closer. The advantages of such closeness exist for the 
organisations too. Engaged in the field of development, it might happen that 
SAMANs themselves are interested in the construction of some infrastructures which 
are included in the projects of development of an area; and it might as well happen 
that the interested SAMAN is ruled by a person close to one of the ministries linked to 
that project. This is what happened for instance,  
 
‘in the case of a urban regeneration initiative, launched in 1995 in the city of 
Tehran, which saw the involvement of a professional association whose duty was 
to carry out part of the project with public funds. According to the inhabitants, who 
opposed the project, there was no need for that intervention and finally the project 
was stopped. Yet the government decided to restart it again two years ago, after a 
strong action of lobby and pressure made by the association whose head, someone 
said, was a [Interior] Minister’s close friend.’59  
 
 
Civil Organisations and the ‘Unintended’ Consequences of Being 
Close to the Government  
Khatami and Ahmadinejad had different aims in promoting a corporatist model of 
state-society interactions. Khatami set up an administrative and bureaucratic apparatus 
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for promoting the establishment of a network of loyalty and ‘political’ support which 
was composed of numerous civil society organisations. When Ahmadinejad gained 
power, he found these social networks and civil organisations established and 
working. He had to deal with them in some ways, and shape them according to his 
interests, which fundamentally diverged from Khatami’s. In some ways however 
Ahmadinejad followed Khatami’s example, as Khatami indicated the road to be 
followed in dealing with societal expressions, offering new meanings and intellectual 
elaboration to the concept of civil society. Ahmadinejad also strongly relied on 
administrative and legal devices to shape social activism, targeting both its ‘form’ and 
its ‘essence.’ He changed the organisations’ objectives by targeting their names, their 
topics of interest and the space for them where they would be politically relevant. 
Ahmadinejad’s efforts have been directed to the creation of a homogeneous society of 
khodi (insiders, meaning loyal people), whilst Khatami wanted to create a supportive, 
organized society in order to carry out his reform plans and channel the protest 
potential his reforms would have caused. 
However, for the ‘politics of participation’ to work all the actors have to be 
involved and not only the government. Civil organisations therefore are not merely 
‘victims’ but actively participate in this system of incentives and disincentives. It is 
clear that the standard for being included is the acceptance of a corporatist model of 
state-society relations. Such collaboration does not always reinforce the government, 
as it also provides civil organisations with a certain ‘bargaining power’ and with the 
possibility of getting an independent dynamics going. If the idea of full-scale 
disappearance of civil society activism is ruled out to begin with by the regime, then 
margins for negotiations exist and it is within these margins that some civil society 
groups can become more autonomous even if formally linked to the and accepting of 
the framework the regime has put in place to regulate their activities.  
This is what happened, for instance, in the case of the student association Tahkim-e 
Vahdat, which has historically been very close to leftist and reformist political circles. 
Shortly after the 1999 unrest,
60
 it decided to follow an independent path from the 
reformist government paying the price for its desired autonomy with political 
marginalization. After the adoption of the gozar az Khatami (‘transition from 
Khatami’, the expression used to indicate that the student movement had to become 
more independent from the Khatami’s government), the organisation was more and 
more marginalized but still the most important student organisation in the country, 
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and a prominent critic of Khatami’s administration. After Ahmadinejad’s electoral 
victory the organisation encountered further difficulties, yet was able to survive and 
show its strength during the 2009 electoral crisis. In the complex game of state-
society relations, civil organisations can get a dynamic on their own, bargaining with 
the government from a position of quasi parity, thanks to the level of closeness they 
enjoy.  
This is what happened in the case of professional organisations as well. A small 
businessman, who works as consultant for foreign companies willing to invest in Iran, 
said that ‘professional associations are today, more than ever, full of ‘indulgent’ 
people and split over government pressure.’61 They may not be ‘the right means for 
channelling the diffused discontent existing in Iran,’ he continued, reflecting on the 
situation of his professional milieu. However the discontent of the businessmen, 
caused by Ahmadinejad’s economic policies and sanctions, has succeeded in 
imposing some of its requests as well. ‘The UN sanctions, together with the sanctions 
of the USA and the EU, have had a real impact on trade and investment in Iran. A 
number of Iranian banks are blacklisted which prevents the allocation of … services 
to Iranian businessmen. This situation results in growing stress among the new 
Islamic capitalism … in Iran and in Dubai, Malaysia and Europe where Iranian 
businessmen are particularly active.’62  In July 2010, the grand bazaar of Tehran 
organized a huge strike after the government announced a hike in the income tax for 
merchants, already hit by the sanctions and macroeconomic difficulties. According to 
the journalists Becky Lee Katz and Ramin Mostaghim, ‘local merchants don’t trust 
the government,’63 a situation which could get an independent and more 
confrontational dynamics against the government. For the moment, the associations of 
merchants succeeded in obtaining the abolition of the tax hike.  
Moving away from a narrow definition of ‘civil activism’ as synonym for formal 
organisation focused on human rights and pro-democracy issues solely, activism has 
proved to be a fundamental force within Iranian society. It has exploded in the context 
of the 2009 events, going well beyond reformist parties and other formal 
organisations. A broader definition of ‘civil activism’ is indeed needed in order to 
make sense of the wide participation in the 2009-2010 protests and of the general 
discontent with the political system that the protesters conveyed. In some way, the 
presence of ‘unusual’ actors voicing their claims against the regime is a consequence 
of Ahmadinejad’s determination in re-shaping the more ‘usual’ civil activism, notably 
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devoted to human rights and similar issues. The entrance of new actors within the 
realm of ‘civil society,’ as it was set by Khatami some years before, has strengthened 
this trend which sees ‘non-traditional actors developing new dynamics of interaction 
between society and the regimes, leading to a reconfiguration of the role and 
objectives of activism.’64 The ‘domination thesis’ indeed explains the strength of the 
limits imposed by the regime in shaping and setting the ‘rules of the game,’ but does 
not prevent ‘unusual’ organisations from acquiring capacity, prestige and bargain 
power for negotiating almost au pair with the regime.  
In this perspective, the government is not the only master, which decides the sorts 
of civil organisations, creates them and directs their action. Rather, the government 
becomes one of the actors in the political economy of state-society interaction. This is 
the crucial similarity between Ahmadinejad and Khatami management of civil 
activism. Their efforts for control, structuring and coercion resulted in an effective 
mastering of organisations on the one side, whilst on the other side they engendered 
dynamics of independent advocacy, which have often taken their strength from the 
closeness to the government the organisations enjoyed.  
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